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Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges. By Stewart Jay.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 288. $35.00.
On August 8, 1793, five Justices of the United States Supreme Court
refused to provide President Washington with the answer to one of the young
republic's most important and politically charged questions (pp. 179-80).'
With a stroke of their pen, these "most obedient and most h'ble Servants" (pp.
179-80)2 at once removed both themselves and the entire future federal
judiciary from the role of providing formal advice to the rest of the
government.3 In Most Humble Servants: The Advisor) Role of Early Judges,
Stewart Jay explores the historical origins of the Justices' refusal to issue
advisory opinions. In contrast to other scholars,4 Jay argues that the 1793
decision was directly influenced by the political climate and the ideological
orientations of key political players at the time; it was not merely the logical
evolution of constitutional structure or the simple acceptance of established
judicial doctrine.5
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
1. Reprinting Letter from John Jay et al.. U.S. Supreme Court Justices. to George Washington.
President of the United States (Aug. 8, 1793).
2. Id.
3. The early Justices did provide a few advisory-type opinions after the 1793 decision. see WILLIAM
R. CASTO, THE SUPREME Coutr IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: TiE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOIt\ JAY AND
OLIvER ELLSWORTH 178 (1995), but most commentators mark the 1793 letter as the recognized end of the
Supreme Court's advisory role. As Jay notes: 'IT]here is general agreement that the 1793 incident provides
the source for not only the prohibition against advisory opinions but an entire constellation of doctnnes
falling under the label of 'justiciability' .... All have been explicitly associated by the Court with the rule
against advisory opinions" (p. 172).
4. See infra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
5. "In the main, both British and American attitudes toward advisory opinions art the product of
historical circumstances and not the result of an overriding vision of the respectice constitutions" (p. 7).
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Jay explicitly declines to apply his historical analysis to the role of the
judiciary in our modem world.6 Nevertheless, his observations, about both the
former advisory role of the judiciary and the circumstances of its rejection,
offer reasons for reexamining the potential for a similar, if modified, role for
the modem federal judiciary. In particular, Jay's historical exploration provides
new support for Guido Calabresi's arguments in favor of a quasi-advisory role
for judges in our constitutional system.7
I
Jay's book presents a strong and convincing historical argument that the
1793 refusal to issue advisory opinions was the result of practical and political
circumstances rather than abstract reasoning from constitutional theory.' Jay
first meticulously establishes that the refusal to issue advisory opinions was
neither necessary nor inevitable under contemporary Anglo-American judicial
tradition and practice (pp. 48, 52, 54) and conceptions of the constitutional
separation of powers (pp. 8, 76). In particular, Jay details the Supreme Court
Justices' considerable pre-1793 extrajudicial activity (p. 92) and judicial advice
(pp. 93, 95-99), including a number of instances in which the Justices wrote
de facto advisory opinions (pp. 103-08). Jay then describes in detail the
political crisis caused by the outbreak of hostilities between France and other
European countries (pp. 113-34), and explains the resulting focus on the
correct interpretation of the United States's treaties of friendship with France,
the question that Washington ultimately put to the Supreme Court (pp. 134-37).
Providing a thorough historical account, Jay argues that two factors explain
the Justices' refusal to answer Washington's question: the political crisis
generated by the split between Jefferson and Hamilton (pp. 153-58), and the
Justices' pragmatic desire to avoid political controversy (p. 175). Jay thus
concludes that personal rivalry and practical, political interests, rather than the
"abstract principles" that the Justices articulated in their letter, generated the
refusal to provide an advisory opinion (p. 177).
Jay's historical argument is a novel and convincing one. American legal
scholarship on advisory opinions previously has not undertaken such detailed
historical analysis.9 Instead, scholars have focused mainly on the doctrinal
6. "The purpose of this book is not to explain, much less to question or even justify, the present vision
of the judicial office. Rather, this book is a historical inquiry into the respective roles of early British and
American judges as advisers to executive and legislative bodies" (p. 5).
7. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982); see also Quill
v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
8. Although he does not dispute the fact that some normative and structural considerations may have
motivated the Justices, Jay argues that the doctrinal explanations are insufficient (p. 3).
9. See, e.g., ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 59 (1936) (reporting
merely that Hamilton drafted Washington's questions and that "[ihe Court respectfully declined to consider
them since they were outside of its province"); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, Advisory Opinions, in LEGAL
ESSAYS 42, 53-54 & 54 n.l (1908) (noting only the sequence of events that occurred in Washington's 1793
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analysis of international and state advisory opinions" and discussions of
justiciability and related issues," providing only brief discussions of the 1793
decision.'2  Most scholars simply accept the decision as a matter of
predetermined constitutional structure 13 or reiterate without reflection the
doctrinal statements given in the Justices' 1793 letter.'4 Although other
scholars present the facts of the decision and reveal a greater advisory role for
the early Justices, none presents a detailed explanation of the 1793 decision.'$
Jay's historical detail thus provides an important counterpoint to the
historically light doctrinal explanations of other commentators.
At the end of his work, Jay concludes that in spite of its practical and
pragmatic origins, the 1793 refusal to provide advisory opinions has become
a paradigm case (p. 172) and thus precedential in its abstract implications (pp.
173-74, 176-77). While it is true that the abstraction has become doctrinally
request for advisory opinions and that advisory opinions were commonplace at the time of the denial). I
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 107-I t(1928) (explaining only the
sequence of events); Russell Wheeler, Ertrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court. 1973 SUP CT
REV. 123, 152 (contending that the decision was primarily influenced by the Justices' a%arencss that their
actions would set constitutional precedent and by their concerns regarding the separation of pocrs)
10. See, e.g., James L. Huffman & MardiLyn Saathoff. Advisors, Opinions and Canadian
Constitutional Development: The Supreme Court's Reference Jurisdiction. 74 MIN. L. R~v 1251 (1990).
Mel A. Topf, The Jurispndence of the AdvisorY Opinion Process ii Rhode Island. 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U
L. REv. 207 (1997); Margaret M. Bledsoe, Comment. The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina: 1947 to
1991, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1853 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Russell W. Galloway, Basic Justiciabdrn" Analysis. 30 SANTA CLARA L REV 911. 913-
14 (1990) (discussing the general rule against advisory opinions as an introduction to the "'case or
controversy" requirement); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionahzing Justictabdir.: The Etample of 3ootness.
105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 647 (1992) (referring to the 1793 rejection in purely doctrinal terms and noting
that "it is now clear that the federal judiciary is constitutionally prohibited from dispensing the kind of
advice that President Washington requested").
12. See, e.g., Oliver P. Field, The Advisors Opinion-An Analysis. 24 1ND. ..U 203. 220-23 (1949)
(presenting merits of advisory opinions); Felix Frankfurter. A Note on Advisor Opinions. 37 HARV L
REV. 1002, 1003-05 (1924) (arguing against advisory opinions); Manley 0. Hudson. Advisory Opinions of
National and International Courts, 37 HARV. L. REv. 970. 975-76 (1924) (briefly discussing the 1793
decision); Note, Advisor) Opinions on the Consitutionalitv of Statutes. 69 HARV L REv 1302. 1317
(1956) (discussing judicial doctrine on advisory opinions).
13. See, e.g., STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. McKTRICK. T HE AGE OF FEDERALISm 352 (1993); I
JULIUS GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801. at 626 n.68 (1971); FORREST MCDONALD.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 280 (1979); I WARREN. supra note 9. at Ill.
14. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 9, at 59; Wheeler. supra note 9. at 152. Charles Warren provides the
clearest example of this kind of doctrinal reasoning. Although Warren recognizes that "the impression was
prevalent at that period that the President had the right to seek the opinion of the Judges on questions of
law," I WARREN, supra note 9, at 109, he still refers to Washington's request as a "radical step." id at 108.
Rather than exploring the events behind the refusal, he simply reports the contents of the Justices' letter
and summarily characterizes the refusal as a "firm stand" by which the Court "'established itself as a purely
judicial body." Id. at 110-11. He provides no explanation for the refusal, instead simply articulating its
doctrinal effect. Other authors present similar treatments (p. 2).
15. Casto, for example, reports that the extrajudicial role of early judges was related to the natural law
jurisprudence popular at the time, see CASTO. supra note 3. at 183. and that advisory opinions %%ere offered
before and after the 1793 decision, see id. at 178-80. He does not explain, however. why the Justices
decided to refuse Washington's request, apart from suggesting that "'[tlhey were not guided by inflexible
rules; their actions are better described as the pragmatic application of general principles to specific
situations." Id. at 173.
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rooted and otherwise justified in American constitutional law,' 6 however,
Jay's historical exploration suggests that the principle's significance may bear
reexamination. More specifically, Jay's work suggests that a quasi-advisory
role along the lines suggested by Guido Calabresi should be reconsidered.
II
Calabresi, in A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,17 argues that
because of the increasing "'statutorification' of American law,"' 8 America
"face[s] a serious problem of legal obsolescence."' 9 To address this problem,
Calabresi argues that judges should consider applying a modified technique of
common-law-like updating of obsolete statutes and common law precedents.20
Courts would decide "when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase
with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can only stand if
a current majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it."2' They would then
apply a kind of second-look doctrine by sending questionable legislation in a
case back to the legislature to determine if it was still up to date: "Often...
the appropriate technique will be to enter into a dialogue, to ask, cajole, or
force another body (usually the legislature but sometimes the agencies) to
define the new rule or reaffirm the old. 22
In some cases, instead of immediately striking down or revising obsolete
or constitutionally questionable statutes, courts could merely threaten to do so,
pressing administrative agencies or legislatures into action by advising them
that the courts might act if these bodies do not.23 Judges would engage in the
dialogue by carefully crafting their opinions,24 creating in some cases what
Calabresi terms "constitutional remand[s]" 25 that suggest, but do not
16. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1647 & n.33 (1997) (noting the long-standing prohibition
on Article III courts' providing advisory opinions and citing history through two centuries of case law).
17. CALABRESI, supra note 7.
18. Id. at I.
19. Id. at 162.
20. See id. at 163-66.
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id.
23. As Calabresi explains:
mhe courts can do any of several things when they have decided that an old rule is out of
phase. They can strike down the existing rule and [1] substitute a new one .... [2) declare a
new rule not of their making to be applicable.... [3] begin the process of creating a new
rule .... [4] revise part of the old rule and leave the rest in a state of uncertainty .... and [5]
leave no rule in effect.... Perhaps more important, they can do none of these things, but
threaten to do any or all of them, if a legislature or administrative agency does not act quickly.
They can shape that legislative or administrative action by announcing, or by failing to
announce, what they will do in the absence of such action.
Id. at 148; see also id. at 149-51 (discussing Florida and Hawaii supreme court cases in which the courts
"refused to act, but suggested that [they] might act unless the legislature reconsidered the old rule within
a set time" as examples of this quasi-advisory technique).
24. See id. at 164.
25. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293
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immediately constitute, judicial action. Although this updating technique is not
a simple advisory opinion in the classic sense, it does involve a statement by
the judiciary to the other branches of government advising them that a law is
close to being unconstitutional or that it is out of date. Constitutional remand,
therefore, is a kind of extrajudicial or advisory function similar to that
exercised by early judges.
Although Calabresi's nineteenth-century common-law-type solution to a
twentieth-century statutory problem may seem unrelated to the history of an
eighteenth-century decision, Jay's conclusion that early judges played an
effective and legitimate advisory role suggests that modern judges might play
a similar quasi-advisory Calabresian one. First, Jay's research suggests that
judges in the Anglo-American tradition have historically been capable of
playing an advisory updating function similar to that advocated by Calabresi.
Eighteenth-century English judges (p. 13), American state judges (p. 56), and
even Supreme Court Justices (pp. 96-97) all gave advisory opinions on
legislative repeal and reform. Some of Calabresi's critics have argued that
judges' performing an updating function is questionable today as a matter of
institutional competence 26 and that judges may have lost some of their
advisory expertise over the past two centuries. The fact that they once
successfully played this role, however, suggests that playing a similar one
would be neither impossible nor undesirable from a practical point of view.-
Additionally, Jay's research adds support to arguments in favor of the
historical legitimacy of such a specific (if limited) role for the judiciary.
Calabresi's critics have specifically questioned the constitutional and general
legitimacy of the constitutional remand.28 Some critics have argued against
it on historical grounds, suggesting comparisons to the quasi-advisory judicial
"Council of Revision" proposal rejected in the Constitutional Convention. 9
(1997). In Quill, Judge Calabresi stated that he would not rule on the constitutionality of the New York
statute forbidding assisting suicide, choosing instead to use a "constitutional remand " Id. at 738-43.
Declining for the time being to reach the constitutional question. Judge Calabresi presented his opinion that
the statute in question was out of date and came close to implicating constitutional issues See id. at 742-43.
26. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification Guido Calabresi s Uncommon Common Law
for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126. 1169 (1982) (reviewing CALABRESI. supra note 7) ("There
is still little basis for confidence that courts are especially competent surveyors of a legal topography...
The courts do not and really cannot function as an ongoing American Law Institute '); Steven Maclsaac.
Common Sense About the Age of Statutes. 81 MICtI. L. REV. 754. 765-68 (1983) (reviewing CALARBRESI.
supra note 7) (questioning judges' abilities to assess majontanan sentiment).
27. But cf Estreicher, supra note 26. at 1169-71 (suggesting that the quast-updattng role of
administrative agencies makes a similar updating role for judges problematic).
28. See, e.g., Frank M. Coffin, The Problem of Obsolete Statutes: A New Role for Courts7. 91 YALE
LJ. 827, 833-36 (1982) (reviewing CALABRESt. supra note 7) (questioning the constitutionality and "fit"
with the legal system of the updating function); Archibald Cox, 70 CAL L. REV. 1463. 1469-70 (1982)
(reviewing CALABRESI, supra note 7) (discussing the majontanan legitimacy of common law powers);
Estreicher, supra note 26. at 1158-65 (questioning the legitimacy of the updating function).
29. For example, Frank Coffin, then chief judge of the First Circuit. criticized the quasi-advisory role
as harkening back to the proposed "Council of Revision." whose rejection by the Framers he interpreted
as a rejection of judges' legislative advisory capabilities. See Coffin. supra note 28. at 835-36. Steven
Maclsaac similarly questioned the remand's legitimacy and viability by asking whether the courts would
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Jay's historical discussion thus suggests two responses to Calabresi's
critics. First, the fact that political realities and not foundational considerations
produced the refusal to provide advisory opinions suggests that some of the
extrajudicial functions that Judge Calabresi advocates may not implicate
structural constitutional concerns.30 Second, and more specifically, the fact
that an advisory role for judges was considered legitimate until 1793 mitigates
legitimacy concerns tied to the intent of the Framers. Indeed, the Framers and
their contemporaries considered an advisory role for the judiciary structurally
legitimate. A quasi-advisory role might therefore be similarly legitimate
today.3"
In sum, Jay develops a sound historical argument that political and
pragmatic, rather than structurally or doctrinally deterministic, considerations
underlie the refusal to provide advisory opinions. Jay's exploration of the past
also suggests new perspectives on the present. His analysis uncovers facts that
demonstrate the practical ability of judges to perform activities similar to the
quasi-advisory updating role proposed by Calabresi, and suggest that the
legitimacy of such a role has a limited historical precedent. Overall, Jay's look
at the advisory role of early judges suggests that we should take a second look
at a quasi-advisory role for our modem most humble servants.
-Jay L. Koh
be able to respond to majoritarian concerns or would merely become "reversible Councils of Revision."
Maclsaac, supra note 26, at 765.
30. The possibility of limited extrajudicial action by a judicial agency or judges was approved with
reference to early extrajudicial activities by judges in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398-408
(1989), which upheld the service of Article III judges on the United States Sentencing Commission and
highlighted the past extrajudicial activities of federal judges, including those of Chief Justice John Jay.
31. Of course, differences abound both between Calabresi's proposed quasi-advisory role and the
historical advisory role, and between the world before 1793 and the world of 1997. First, complexities in
modem statutory and administrative law may make practical comparisons to mechanisms last used in 18th-
century America entirely irrelevant. Second, differences between Calabresi's constitutional remand and the
historical advisory opinion may undermine arguments from historical legitimacy. For example, the
constitutional remand can sometimes lead to the actual striking down of out-of-date laws, see CALABRESI,
supra note 7, at 2, while advisory opinions have traditionally had no direct binding effect, see THAYER,
supra note 9, at 46-56. Additionally, advisory opinions are requested; Calabresi's quasi-advisory actions
may be taken sua sponte, which has implications for the balance of legislative and judicial powers. Cf.
Maclsaac, supra note 26, at 768 ("This is dialogue with a vengeance."). Finally, the growth in the
separation-of-powers doctrine and the evolution of the federal government may also render arguments about
legitimacy drawn from the history of early judges less relevant. Jay himself states that the 1793 decision
has become a paradigm case for the proposition that Article III courts will not engage in the issuance of
advisory opinions (p. 172), and the modem Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its strong doctrinal
opposition to providing advisory opinions, see, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1647 & n.33 (1997).
Thus, although an advisory role might have been viable in the early republic, modem considerations may
have made even a quasi-advisory role for judges undesirable, illegitimate, or otherwise unworkable today.
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